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The passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) and the Jumpstart Our Business Startups
(JOBS) Act provided the impetus for several changes in the financial reg-
ulatory regime. In the securities markets, Dodd-Frank included provisions
that lifted a ban on general solicitation and mandated a review of the ac-
credited investor standard.1 These changes, while intended to increase
capital formation within our private markets, also brought to light serious
investor protection issues. This note advocates for a new accredited inves-
tor standard that more accurately reflects the risks associated with invest-
ing in the private markets.
Section I of this note will describe the formation of the current accred-
ited investor standard. It will discuss how private placements were tradi-
tionally determined by whether an investor had the proper sophistication
to participate in the transaction. It will also explain how the entry qualifi-
cation has changed to a loss-bearing standard through the current stan-
dard. Section II of this note will assess possible reasons why a gatekeeping
role exists for private markets. It will distinguish private placement trans-
actions from those that occur through registered offerings.
Section III of this note will present the problems arising from the cur-
rent accredited investor standard. Specifically, it will seek to divorce
wealth from serving as a proxy for sophistication. To this end, it will ana-
lyze institutional failures and behavioral biases that exist for the wealthiest
investors, as well as the various methods of wealth accumulation. Finally,
it will describe how the current standard does not adequately evaluate the
loss tolerance of an investor, and leaves a substantially large class of indi-
viduals unprotected.
Section IV of this note evaluates the policy considerations for private
market participation. It offers a way to curb risks associated with offerings
in private markets. It argues that the primary goals should include investor
sophistication and loss bearing, while also taking into account capital for-
mation. Section V offers a basic outline that would advance these goals.
I. BACKGROUND: THE RISE OF THE ACCREDITED INVESTOR
In order to understand the necessity of an accredited investor standard
it is important to distinguish between the private and public markets. The
Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”) created this distinction in Section
5 by requiring registration of securities sold by issuers unless they were
1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111–203,
§ 413(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1577-78 (2010); Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No.
112-106, § 201(a), 126 Stat. 306, 313–15 (2012).
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exempt.2 The seminal case of SEC v. Ralston Purina limited private offer-
ings to only those investors who were able to “fend for themselves.”3
These investors do not require the benefits of registered securities because
they are able to substantiate their own sophistication to alleviate disadvan-
tages created by the lack of oversight by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”). The legislative history that ultimately culminated in
the current accredited investor standard exemplifies the importance of in-
vestor sophistication to this standard.
A. Legislative History of Rule 4(a)(2)
The history of the current accredited investor standard can be traced
back to the late 1920’s amidst the greatest economic depression that the
U.S. capital markets has ever experienced. The period just before the
stock market crash of 1929 was fraught with investor speculation. Among
other reasons, it was fueled by investor confidence that the newly estab-
lished Federal Reserve would help alleviate the volatile stock markets
characterized by booms and busts.4
Increased confidence resulted in greater speculation by investors. Trad-
ers would routinely use debt to leverage their investments in the hopes of
stronger returns.5 Investors continued to buy securities despite numerous
recommendations that indicated the instability of stock prices.6 Unfortu-
nately, the period leading up to the market crash was characterized by a
lack of analytical considerations in favor of “pseudo-analysis” that pushed
the market upwards.7 On Thursday, October 24, 1929 the market col-
lapsed with billions of dollars lost. The Federal Reserve blamed the crash
on market speculation.8
Although the market crash had a devastating effect on most of the
country, some in the industry had predicted its occurrence. Roger Bab-
son’s United Business Service advised the sale of stocks in September and
October of 1929 because of “tight money.”9 Additionally, some exper-
ienced market participants were able to avoid the loss. Eugene Meyer,
2. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d-e.
3. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953).
4. EDWARD CHANCELLOR, DEVIL TAKE THE HINDMOST: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL
SPECULATION 192 (2000); Felicia Smith, Madoff Ponzi Scheme Exposes “The Myth of the
Sophisticated Investor,” 40 U. BAL. L. REV. 215, 244 n. 126 (2010).; Investors borrowed as
little as 10% of their total investment in order to complete their purchase. See Croft Commu-
nications, Causes, THE GREAT DEPRESSION (2015), http://thegreatdepressioncauses.com/
causes/.
5. See CHANCELLOR, supra note 4, at 192.
6. BARRIE A. WIGMORE, THE CRASH ITS AFTERMATH: A HISTORY OF SECURITIES
MARKETS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1929 – 1933 5 (Robert Sobel ed., Greenwood Press 2015).
7. BENJAMIN GRAHAM & DAVID DODD, SECURITY ANALYSIS: THE CLASSIC 1940, 11,
14 (2ND ED.2002).
8. WIGMORE, supra note 6, at 10.
9. Id. at 5.
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who ultimately became Governor of the Federal Reserve Board, and
Percy Rockefeller, began selling their shares.10 John Raskob, the chairman
of the Democratic Party and the financial authority on the board of Du
Pont de Nemours & Co., as well as General Motors Corp., followed suit.11
The response to the market failure came in the form of the Securities
Act of 1933. The Act was predicated on providing “full and fair disclosure
of the character of securities . . . to prevent frauds in [their] sale.”12 The
goal was accomplished by an overall requirement to register all “securi-
ties” sold.13 The legislation includes a broad definition of the term “securi-
ties” to presumably allow for maximum inclusion.14 This legislation
required registered securities to comply with information requirements as-
sociated with their offerings through the use of prospectuses and registra-
tion statements.15 Additionally, the specter of civil liability provided an
added incentive for the compliance of regulations.16 Issuers could face lia-
bility not only for material misstatements but also omissions.17
Congress, however, allowed exemption from registration and informa-
tion requirements in areas where “there [was] no practical need for its
application or where the public benefits are too remote.”18 Most impor-
tant of these exemptions was section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act, which
exempted “transactions not involving a public offering.”19 Congress left
the term “public offerings” undefined. The Supreme Court subsequently
interpreted the term in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Ralston
Purina Co. Ralston Purina, a feed and cereal products company, had sold
two million dollars worth of its common stock to its employees as a gen-
eral policy of encouraging employee ownership.20 Offers to buy securities
were made to, among others, “artist, bakeshop foreman, chow loading
foreman, clerical assistant, copywriter, electrician, stock clerk, mill office
clerk, order credit trainee, production trainee, stenographer, and veterina-
10. Id. at 4.
11. Id.
12. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2012) (referring to statute’s preamble).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. § 77e(b)-(c) (2006) (requiring a registration statement to be filed before the
offer of securities can be conducted, as well the filing of a prospectus before sales can be
conducted); Id. § 77j (2006) (specifying the information required in a registration statement).
16. Id. § 77k (2006) (imposing liability misstatements in the registration statement); Id.
at § 77l (imposing liability for violations in complying with registration requirements and
false communications in the prospectus).
17. Id.
18. H. R. REP. NO. 73-85, AT 5 (1933).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2) (2006).
20. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 121 (1953).
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rian.”21 The SEC brought suit alleging that the company sold securities
without proper registration under Section 5 of the Securities Act.22
Interpreting the claim that Ralston Purina’s securities were exempt
from registration requirements since its transactions were not associated
with a public offering, the Court determined that the availability of the
exemption should be based on “whether a particular class of persons af-
fected needs the protections of the act.”23 The measure for this determina-
tion, the Court concluded, was whether persons were able to “fend for
themselves.”24 Although the court determined that Ralston’s offerees did
not fit this criteria, it also stated that corporate executives may fit this
criteria because of their access to the type of information available in a
registration statement.25  Investor sophistication and access to information
became key factors for the courts in deciding whether a transaction quali-
fied as a private offering.26
B. Regulation D and the Accredited Investor Standard
In order to provide more clarity to issuers and investors the SEC
sought to interpret the Ralston Purina decision through the use of an ac-
credited investor standard. In 1974, the SEC adopted Rule 146, which re-
quired that investors be financially sophisticated enough to be offered
private placements based on their knowledge and experience, capability of
evaluating the risks and merits, and ability to bear the economic risk of the
investment.27 Special attention was paid to whether investors could afford
to hold their investments for an indefinite period, and if they could afford
a total loss.28 Borrowing from Ralston Purina and its progenies, the rule
also required that the issuer believe that the offeree have such knowledge
and experience in financial and business matters that he is capable of eval-
uating the risks and merits of the prospective investment.29
Though meant to be an objective standard, Rule 146 still suffered from
several problems. In 1980, Congress included amendments in the Securi-
ties Act to provide incentives for small businesses.30 The statute contained
21. See id. at 121.
22. Id. at 120.
23. Id. at 124-25.
24. Id. at 125.
25. Id. at 125-26.
26. See Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 903 (5th Cir. 1977) (discussing
the need for both investor sophistication and access to information to comply with Ralston
Purina).
27. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-640 SECURITIES AND EX-
CHANGE COMMISSION: ALTERNATIVE CRITERIA FOR QUALIFYING AS AN ACCREDITED
INVESTOR SHOULD BE CONSIDERED 8 (2013), http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/655963.pdf.
28. Id.
29. CHARLES JOHNSON & JOSEPH MCLAUGHLIN, CORPORATE FINANCE AND THE SE-
CURITIES LAWS 7-13 (4th ed. 2013).
30. Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1989, Pub. L. 94-477, 94 Stat. 2275.
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the concept of an accredited investor and specified institutions that may
qualify. Additionally, Congress used the opportunity allow the SEC to fur-
ther expand on the definition by considering a person’s “financial sophisti-
cation, net worth, knowledge and experience in financial matters, or
amounts of assets under management.”31 By this time, lawmakers had be-
gun to abandon the difficult factor driven test, in favor of a more bright-
line concepts. The SEC used this rule making authority to create Regula-
tion D. The regulation allowed private placements to be offered based on
three exemptions – Rule 504, 505, and 506.32 Both Rules 505 and 506 lim-
ited the offering to 35 purchasers.33 However, in the counting procedure
for purchasers, accredited investors were excluded.34 Combined with the
unlimited capital raises allowed under Rule 506, issuers could raise a virtu-
ally indefinite amount of funds through a limitless pool of purchasers, as
long as they were accredited investors.
An accredited investor, defined in Rule 501 of Regulation D, includes
institutional investors, insiders, as well as individuals.35 Specifically, an in-
dividual can qualify as an accredited investor if their net worth exceeds $1
million, excluding the value of their primary residence.36 They can also
qualify if their income is above $200,000 in the past two years, with the
expectation that it will stay stagnant in the current year.37 Finally, the test
was revised to include a spouse’s income, expanding the threshold to
$300,000 in annual income.38 These tests were presumed to ensure that
accredited investors possessed the requisite sophistication to comprehend
the risks and benefits associated with their investments.39
II. DIFFERENTIATING THE PRIVATE PLACEMENT
AND REGISTERED MARKETS
Investor sophistication continues to play a prominent role in the design
of the accredited investor standard. In the years after the stock market
crash, perhaps recognizing that there were sophisticated individuals who
were not misled by the ramped market speculation, Congress allowed the
section 4(a)(2) exemption from registration.40 The exemption was inter-
preted by the Supreme Court to apply only to those individuals who could
31. 15 U.S.C. § 77B(a)(15)(ii) (2015).
32. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504-06.
33. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.505(b)(2)(ii), 230.506(b)(2)(i).
34. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(e)(1)(iv) (stating that “for the purposes of calculating the
number of purchasers under [Rule 505 and 506] . . . the following purchasers shall be ex-
cluded . . . [a]ny accredited investor”).




39. See Felicia Smith, Madoff Ponzi Scheme Exposes “The Myth of the Sophisticated
Investor,” 40 U. BAL. L. REV. 215, 251 (2010).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2) (2006).
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“fend for themselves.”41 This interpretation led the SEC to design Rule
146, which sought to isolate whether an investor had the necessary sophis-
tication to evaluate the risks of the investment. The current iteration uses
wealth as a proxy for the assessment of the same sophistication as its pred-
ecessor sophistication. In order to understand the need for sophistication
in the private market, it is necessary to distinguish it from the public mar-
kets. In the public market, there is no sophistication requirement, nor is it
necessary to maintain a certain amount of wealth. Still, the SEC allows any
and all participants to engage in trading.42 Since the Ralston Purina’s case
phrased that the participants in a private offering must be able to fend for
themselves, by reverse implication, public market participants are either
able to protect themselves or are protected by others. The core difference
between the two markets is the SEC disclosure regime, and our accept-
ance of the efficient market hypothesis.
A. The SEC Disclosure Regime
The registration of securities for public offerings is accompanied by
several disclosure obligations. Based on Section 5 of the Securities Act,
any sale of securities must accompany with it a prospectus complying with
Section 10 of the Securities Act.43 Section 10 prospectuses require infor-
mation that is contained in the registration statement.44 This includes in-
formation about the company’s financials,45 special instances for the use of
proceeds46, as well as general information about the company and its busi-
ness.47 Additionally, after a company goes public, there are new disclosure
obligations that need to be met. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(“Exchange Act”) requires periodic filings through the use of Form 10-K
and Form 10-Q, and also requires Form 8-K filings in special
circumstances.48
One of the key reasons for investor sophistication is to assess the abil-
ity of individuals to be able to distinguish information that is useful from
that which is not. The Fifth Circuit expanded on this point in Doran v.
41. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953).
42. Although trading is now generally conducted by large institutional investors, there
is still a significant portion of trades executed by individual investors. While institutional
investors are generally accepted to be sophisticated, individuals may or may not carry such a
trait. See Generally Ronald K Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Cost of Agency Capi-
talism: Activist Investors and Revaluation of Goerance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 874-
88 (2013); see also MATTEO TONELLO & STEPHAN RABIMOV, THE CONFERENCE BD., Inc.,
THE 2010 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT REPORT: TRENDS IN ASSET ALLOCATION AND PORT-
FOLIO COMPOSITION 22tbl.10 (2010), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1707512.
43. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2015).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 77j (2015).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 77aa(25)-(26) (2015).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (27) (2015).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1)-(8) (2015).
48. 15 U.S.C. § 78l (2015).
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Petroleum Management Corp.49 The case involved a sophisticated investor
who purchased securities in an oil-drilling venture.50 In evaluation of Pe-
troleum Management’s claim of the 4(a)(2) exemption, the court felt that
it was obligated to decide if any offeree in the transaction was “blind.”51
Drawing on the reasoning in Ralston Purina, the court held that if the
offeree simply had access to the information, as would be required in a
registration statement, the relationship between the offeree and the issuer
gains special importance.52 Specifically, the offeree must have sufficient
competence “to ask the right questions and seek out the relevant informa-
tion.”53 Thus, sophistication isn’t merely necessary to access information;
it is needed to access “relevant information.”
In a public market, the SEC has already made the determination of
what information is relevant. For companies that trigger the Exchange Act
disclosure requirements,54 the SEC has mandated that certain financial,
property, management, and legal information be disclosed to the public.55
Additionally, issuers are expected to discuss the health of their business in
the Management Discussion and Analysis section of the 10-K. Similarly, in
the event that there are any material changes or non-public material dis-
closures, the issuer is required to file an 8-K in order to update the pub-
lic.56 Thus, public companies are required to keep the market abreast of
important information affecting their businesses.
B. The Efficient Market Hypothesis
While sophistication is needed to access the relevant information, it is
also necessary to actually comprehend the information. In the public mar-
ket there are a large number of retail investors that may not have financial
sophistication. However, they are able to participate in the market be-
cause of our reliance on the Efficient Market Hypothesis. When function-
ing effectively under the Efficient Market Hypothesis, retail investors are
49. See Doran, supra note 26.
50. Id. at 897.
51. Id. at 902.
52. See id.
53. Id. at 905.
54. Generally the disclosure requirements can be triggered by three ways: (1) by listing
one’s self on an exchange, (2) by having over 2,000 holders and 10,000,000 in assets, or (3) by
registering for a public offering. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78l (a)-(b), § 78o (d) (2015) (Trigger two sug-
gests that even if the company has engaged in a number of exempt offerings, perhaps through
Regulation D, after a certain level the company is sufficiently public enough to warrant in-
vestor protection).
55. Form 10, Information Required In Registration Statement, Items (1)(2)(3)(8), SEC,
available at https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/.pdf (last visited November 7, 2015).
56. Form 8-K, General Instructions. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, available at https://www
.sec.gov/about/forms/form8-k.pdf (last visited November 7, 2015).
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able to take advantage of sophisticated investor’s abilities when making
investment decisions.57
The Efficient Market Hypothesis suggests that in a semi-strong form
market, which competitors believe reflects the U.S. capital markets, inves-
tors are rational actors that are profit driven.58 If the theory assumptions
hold true, all publicly available information is evaluated by investment
analysts and reflected in the public price for the security.59 Investment
analysts use their superior diligence methods and financial experience to
decipher relevant information, and by trading on that knowledge, prevent
price inflation.60 The investor should feel secure that the price they are
paying is “fair,” in relation to the information available. Ultimately, this
builds investors’ confidence and individuals are generally able to buy and
sell these securities if they have the available funds. Due to the large pool
of buyers, the market is generally liquid.61
C. The Private Placement Market
The private markets operate quite differently from the public market
outlined above. While the case law requires issuers utilizing the 4(a)(2)
exemption to disclose information that would be similar to that contained
in a registration statement, the form is not determined.62 Additionally, the
vast majority of private placements today take place under Regulation
D.63 Regulation D only mandates disclosure in the event that the partici-
pant is not an accredited investor.64 This is presumably because accredited
investors are able to fend for themselves. Still the fact remains, in a private
57. Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Prichard, Securities Regulation: Cases and Analysis 32-34
(Robert C. Clark et. al. eds., 4th ed.).
58. See generally Eugene S. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and
Empirical Work, 25 JOURNAL OF FINANCE 383 (1970).
59. See Jonathan Clarke, Tomas Jadik, & Gershon Mandelker, The Efficient Market
Hypothesis, Efficient Markets Hypothesis (May 10, 2015 10:30 PM), available at http://m.e-m-
h.org/ClJM.pdf.
60. Id. at 5-6  ( “Semi-strong efficiency of markets requires the existence of market
analysts who are not only financial economists able to comprehend implications of vast finan-
cial information, but also macroeconomists, experts adept at understanding processes in
product and input markets”).
61. Fama, supra note 56.
62. Cf. Ralston Purina supra note 20 (not discussing the manner in which information
must be reflected).
63. SEC, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, REPORT NO. 459, REGULATION D EXEMP-
TION PROCESS 2 n.18 (2009). Additionally the market for private placements may dwarf that
of registered securities. Thomson Reuters estimated that over $1.7 trillion worth of securities
were raised by private placement from 2005 to 2009. https://www.sifma.org/WorkArea/
DownloadAsset.aspx?id=8589956792, slide 10. In contrast, the SEC reported approximately
$699 billion of securities registered during that time. 2009 U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Per-
formance and Accountability Report at 42 fig.2.23 (2009), available at https://.sec.gov/about/
secpar/secpar2009.pdf.
64. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b) (2013).
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offering involving only accredited investors, no disclosure is necessary.65
To make up for this short fall, large investors negotiate for disclosure.66
However, due to the private nature of the transaction, there may be dis-
parities in information available to each particular investor.
Additionally, since private placement shares are restricted,67 the effi-
cient market hypothesis does not always hold true. New public informa-
tion is not reflected into the price of the security. An investor must either
rely on their own savvy, or the savvy of a price setter to procure an accu-
rate price.
Additionally, because information flow is less regulated and private
companies are generally less mature then public companies, private mar-
kets are generally considered high-risk investments.68 Therefore, even if
companies disclose their historical information, the relatively small
amount of information may not produce an accurate forecast of their fu-
ture performance.69
Securities procured through private placements may also be virtually
impossible to sell.70 For issuers that rely on Rule 4(a)(2) to complete an
exempt offering, purchasers are required to demonstrate investment intent
if they seek to engage in selling securities.71 Courts use a two-year period
to presume that a security has come to rest and was purchased with invest-
ment intent. Investors can sell securities prior to that, but they bear the
burden of establishing a “change in circumstance.”72 Additionally, Regu-
lation D offerings allow securities to be traded if they are registered or
qualify for another exemption.73 The most common exemptions are Rule
144 and Rule 144A. Rule 144 imposes holding and information periods for
issuers that may last one year.74 While Rule 144A does not require any
65. Id.
66. Patrick Simpson, Tips For Conducting A Private Placement, LAW360 (July 02,
2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/453476/tips-for-conducting-a-private-placement (dis-
cussing private disclosures in the form of Private Placement Memorandums).
67. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d).
68. SEC, Investor Bulletin on Private Placements Under Regulation D (Sept. 24,
2014), http://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-bulletins/ib_privateplacements.html.
69. See Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) Analysis, MACABCUS (May 12, 2015 12:30 PM),
http://macabacus.com/valuation/dcf/overview; See also Step 1—Project Free Cash Flow,
STOCKS 400 (May 12, 2015 1:00 PM), http://news.morningstar.com/classroom2/course.asp?
docId=145102&page=2&CN= (This is under the assumption that investors are using a Dis-
counted Future Cash Flow analysis. While the method is used to predict future cash flows,
many assumptions of future cash flows can be derived from historical data. The larger the
data pool, the more effective the analysis.).
70. SEC Investor Bulletin, supra note 68.
71. CHOI & PRICHARD, supra note 57.
72. Id.
73. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d).
74. 17 C.F.R § 230.144(d).
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holding period, sales can only occur to institutional investors.75 The differ-
ence between disclosure and accurate pricing may be the need for differ-
ent types of participates in the private and public markets.
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE ACCREDITED INVESTOR STANDARD
In recent years the accredited investor standard has gained substantial
attention. Specifically, after the great recession in 2008, where a large
amount of individuals lost substantial sums, Congress enacted the Dodd-
Frank Act. Under Section 413(a) of the Act, Congress authorized the SEC
to review the accredited investor definition as it applied to individuals.76
The legislation required the SEC to remove primary residence from the
net worth standard in an effort to create a more accurate standard.77 Ad-
ditionally, the obligation to review the standard was renewed every four
years.78 The regulation has offered an opportunity to discuss the costs and
benefits of the current standard.
There are both merits and failures of the current accredited investor
definition. Although there are some common defenses for the current
standard, wealth is a poor proxy for investor sophistication because of (a)
the different methods of wealth accumulation, and (b) instances where in-
stitutional investors failed to properly evaluate market risks. I will demon-
strate how the complexity of the current financial market requires more
expert market participants and how even sophisticated investors may fall
prey to behavioral biases. Finally, I will discuss how these failures can have
an especially strong impact on certain classes of individuals.
A. Common Defenses to the Accredited Investor Standard
The defense of the accredited investor standard has generally centered
around three different arguments. First, individuals with high net worth or
annual income have a greater ability to bear the loss of their investment.79
Second, individuals with wealth, although they may not have financial so-
phistication, are able to employ sophisticated representatives on their be-
half.80 Finally, there is a general fear that changing the accredited investor
standard will curb capital formation.81 This last concern requires some
75. Specifically, sales must occur  to Qualified Institutional Buyers, which is defined to
include large insurance or investment companies, dealers, or banks. 17 C.F.R 230.144A.
76. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, §413(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1577 (2010); see generally Net Worth Standard For Accredited
Investor, 76 Fed. Reg.  5307 (proposed Jan. 31, 2011).
77. Dodd-Frank, supra note 74.
78. Id.
79. SEC, Investor Bulletin on Accredited Investors (Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.sec
.gov/investor/alerts/ib_accreditedinvestors.pdf.
80. See Greg Oguss, Should Size or Wealth Equal Sophistication in Federal Securities
Laws?, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 285, 294 (2012).
81. See So-Yeon Lee, Note, Why the “Accredited Investor” Standard Fails the Average
Investor, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 987, 991 (2012).
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elaboration. Issuing private placements and side stepping federal regula-
tions offers a reduction in transaction costs to obtain capital.82 Thus, issu-
ers are able to make more efficient use of their capital by deploying more
of it to the building of their business.83
B. Failure of Wealth Based Tests in Determining Sophistication
The accredited investor standard, which polices entry into the private
markets, is fraught with issues when it comes to protecting the individual
investor. It is misaligned with the Supreme Court’s original intention for
the private markets to include only sophisticated parties. Although Regu-
lation D, which includes the accredited investor standard, was promul-
gated with the objective of providing a clear standard to determine if a
purchaser has the “sufficient knowledge and experience in financial and
business matters” to evaluate the risks of private markets,84 it only evalu-
ates financial metrics.85 While it is possible that some correlation exists,
wealth ultimately serves as a poor proxy for sophistication.86
1. Diverse Methods of Wealth Accumulation
The assumption underlying the argument that high net worth individu-
als have procured some amount of financial literacy proves faulty when
examining certain ways in which wealth is accumulated. First, wealth may
be accumulated by windfall, like through inheritance or games of
chance.87 Building wealth in this manner requires little more than being in
the right situation. More realistically, wealth building may be an incremen-
tal process.88 An owner of an auto repair shop may, over the course of
their working life, save enough money to accumulate a retirement nest egg
of $1 million. However, this process does not necessarily equip the
mechanic to evaluate the risks presented by highly complex assets in the
private market.
2. Institutional Investor Failures
Even when examining institutional investors, there is evidence that
they may not always fully comprehend the risks of particular investments.
Gregg Oguss offers an insightful study of instances where this is the case.89
82. Id.
83. Howard M. Friedman, On Being Rich, Accredited, and Undiversified: The Lacunae
in Contemporary Securities Regulation, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 291, 299-300 (1994).
84. SEC, Fast Answers, RULE 506 OF REGULATION D, http://www.sec.gov/answers/
rule506.htm (last modified Oct. 6, 2014).
85. 17 C.F.R 230.501(a)(5)-(6).
86. See generally Oguss, supra note 78.
87. See Lee, supra note 79 at 991.
88. See Net Worth and Asset Ownership of Households: 2011, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
available at http://www.census.gov/people/wealth/files/Wealth_Tables_2011.xlsx (showing
high proportions of IRA savings).
89. See Oguss, supra note 78, at 301-10.
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The first instance centered on the derivative woes of the 1990s. During
that time, several large institutional investors, such as Procter and Gamble
(“P&G”), lost huge amounts of capital on interest-rate swap vehicles.90
Upon closer examination, Oguss concluded that these investors placed
bets on positions that they did not completely comprehend.91
In 1993 P&G approached Bankers Trust to discuss products that would
help it take advantage of interest rate movements.92 Later that same year,
paying double what they initially planned, P&G bought leveraged derivate
products for $200 million.93 Since derivative securities experience higher
fluctuations, they have much greater downside potential compared to reg-
ular derivatives.94 Ultimately, the transaction’s upside, when compared to
other possibilities, was relatively minuscule.95 Additionally, when the Fed-
eral Reserve announced that short-term interest rates would rise, P&G,
contradictory to conventional thinking, increased their investments in the
product with the hope that rates would change.96 Ultimately, P&G settled
with Bankers Trust, partly due to recordings where bankers gloated that
their customers knew little about the risks of their transactions.97
In the 2000s Collateralized Debt Obligations (“CDOs”) rose in popu-
larity as an investment product. Though the investment craze in CDOs is
notorious for its effect on housing prices, there were several institutional
investors that suffered losses.98 In 2007 IKB Deutsche Industriebank had
been purchasing CDOs backed by prime and subprime mortgages.
Goldman Sachs, with the aid of Paulson & Co. as well as ACA Manage-
ment, created and marketed CDOs called ABACUS 2007-AC1.99 Nine
months after IKB’s $150 million investment the house market collapsed
and the investment was essentially worthless.100 Suggesting an inability to
properly evaluate the risks of these speculative investments, Goldman
90. See Lawrence Malkin, Procter & Gamble’s Tale of Derivatives Woe, INT’L HERALD
TRIB., Apr. 14, 1994, at 9.
91. Oguss, supra note 80, at 303.
92. Carol J. Loomis, Untangling the Derivatives Mess, FORTUNE, Mar. 20, 1995, at 50,
62.
93. Id. at 64.
94. Kelley Holland & Linda Himelstein, The Bankers Trust Tapes, BUS. WK., at 106,
110 (Oct. 16, 1995).
95. See Loomis, supra note 92, at 64.
96. Id.
97. See generally Holland & Himelstein, supra note 94, at 108.
98. See Marc Pitzke, Wall Street vs. Washington: Goldman Sachs Goes on the Offen-
sive, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Apr. 22, 2010, 3:19 PM), http:// www.spiegel.de/international/business/
0,1518, 690527,00.html.
99. See Philip Whalen & Kara Tan Bhala, Goldman Sachs and the ABACUS Deal,
SEVEN PILLARS INST. FOR GLOBAL FIN. & ETHICS, http://sevenpillarsinstitute.org/case-stud-
ies/goldman-sachs-and-the-abacus-deal.
100. Gregory Corcoran, SEC v. Goldman: Meet One Abacus Investor, WALL ST. J.
DEAL J. (Apr. 16, 2010, 12:26 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2010/04/16/sec-v-goldman-
meet-one-abacus-investor/.
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Sachs lost more than $100 million in the investment, which wiped out their
$15 million fee.101
Additionally, both the Enron102 and Madoff scandals offer caution to
those who believe that wealth is a strong proxy for good investment deci-
sion-making. Specifically, the Madoff scandal implicated a remarkable
lack of diligence by sophisticated investors.103 Some investors conducted,
at most, pro forma diligence on the investment program before sending
large sums of funds to be invested.104 Decisions by Madoff investors could
be explained by behavioral economic factors such as sunk cost fallacy, the
endowment effect, and hyperbolic discounting.105
3. Behavioral Biases May Exist even in Sophisticated Investors
As discussed earlier, the basis for the accredited investor definition is
that sophisticated investors are able to fend for themselves. Even assum-
ing that wealth is an accurate proxy for financial sophistication, studies
suggest that these investors may not always be able to fend for themselves.
Illustrative of this is the disposition effect, which is characterized by a de-
creased propensity to realize losses and an increased propensity to realize
gains.106
In a study regarding investment behavior in Finland, it was shown that
disposition effect was found in several investor types, including non-finan-
cial corporations, financial and insurances institutions, as well as govern-
ment and non-profit intuitions.107 The phenomenon is known to affect
sophisticated investors such as futures traders, professional account man-
agers, and proprietary stock traders.108
101. Oguss, supra note 78, at 306.
102. Frank A. Walak, Policy Brief: Making Sense of the Enron Nonsense, STANFORD
INSTITUTE FOR ECON POLICY RESEARCH, 1 (2002) http://web.stanford.edu/group/siepr/cgi-
bin/siepr/?q=system/files/shared/pubs/papers/briefs/policybrief_may02.pdf (stating that
“[e]ven the most sophisticated market watchers were unable to divine Enron’s Profit posi-
tions from its financial statements.”).
103. See Smith, supra note 39 at 253.
104. See Madoff’s Victims, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 6, 2009), http://s.wsj.net/public/resources/
documents/st_madoff_victims20081215.html.
105. Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization of
the Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1046 (2009).
106. Lei Feng & Mark S. Seasholes, Do Investor Sophistication and Trading Experience
Eliminate Behavioral Biases in Financial Markets, 9 REV. OF FINANCE 305, 305 (2005) availa-
ble at http://www.seasholes.com/files/Paper_Feng_Seasholes_2005_RoF.pdf.
107. Mark Grinblatt & Matti Keloharju, What Makes Investors Trade?, 56 J. OF FIN.
589, 589–616 (2001).
108. Ryan Garvey & Anthony Murphy, Are Professional Traders Too Slow to Realize
Their Losses?, 60 FIN. ANALYST J., July/Aug. 2004 at 35–43 (stating that US proprietary trad-
ers “realized their winning trades at a much faster rate their losing trades”); Joshua D. Coval
& Tyler Shumway, Do Behavioral Biases Affect Prices? 60(1) J. OF FIN. 1, 1–34 (2004) (show-
ing that proprietary trader of T-Bpnf futures “appear highly loss adverse, regularly assuming
above-average afternoon risks to recover from morning losses”); Paul G.J. O’Connell &
Melvyn Teo, Prospect Theory and Institutional Investors (Working Paper, 2003), http://
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C. Failure of the Current Standard in Assessing Bearing
Loss of Investments
According to the SEC, a principle purpose of the accredited investor
definition is for individuals to bear the loss of their investments.109 Unfor-
tunately, the current standard does not do an adequate job of pacifying
this concern. The standard measures loss tolerance by two metrics – net
worth, and annual income.110 An individual’s net worth is calculated by
the difference between their total assets and total liabilities.111 The mea-
sure does not pay any regard to the liquidity of an individual’s assets.112
The oversight is significant in several regards. For instance, an individual
who makes investments in liquid assets, which subsequently fail, may be
forced to sell his or her positions in order to meet capital needs. However,
sales of illiquid assets include a liquidity discount to compensate the pur-
chaser for their inability to make resales.113
The gross income test for individual investors fails for similar reasons.
The standard simply looks at an individual’s income without regard to ex-
penses that they may have.114 As an illustration, based on the current stan-
dard, sixth-year associates at large law firms would be able to participate
in the private market, even though many would be burdened with a high
amount of loan repayments.115 By failing to measure expenses and debts,
the current standard allows for situations where an investor could be
overly leveraged and may not be able to absorb the loss of highly risky
private placement investments.116
faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/lyons/Oconnell%20Teo%20prospect%20theory.pdf (finding that
institutional money managers from State Street “aggressively reduce risk in the wake of
losses, but only mildly increase risk in the wake of gains).
109. Investor Bulletin, supra note 77.
110. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a).
111. Investor Bulletin, supra note 77.
112. Jeremy Vohwinkle, How to Calculate Your Net Worth, ABOUT MONEY, http://
financialplan.about.com/od/personalfinance/ht/networthhowto.htm (last visited May 10,
2015).
113. Alvin L. Arnold, REAL ESTATE INVESTOR’S DESKBOOK § 2:12(5) (Warren,
Gorham, & Lamont eds., 3d ed. 1994).
114. Lee, supra note 79, at 993.
115. See 2015 LawCrossing Salary Survey Of Lawyer Salaries In Best Law Firms, LAW-
CROSSING, http://www.lawcrossing.com/article/900043256/2015-LawCrossing-Salary-Survey-
of-Lawyer-Salaries-in-Best-Law-Firms/ (last visited May 10, 2015) (reviewing the current
lock step figures, a sixth year associate would be making $250,000 and would have earned
over $200,000 in each of the two previous years).
116. Law School graduates from the top fourteen law schools as ranked by US News,
on average, all graduate with over $100,000 in law school debt, with several schools graduat-
ing students with over $150,000 in debt. Which Law School Graduates Have the Most Debt,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, http://money.cnn.com/2014/07/15/pf/jobs/lawyer-salaries/ (dis-
cussing declining income and rising debt levels) (last visited May 10, 2015).
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D. Unprotected Class: Elderly
The problem with the current accredited investor standard is not just
that it may be under-inclusive in theory, it also leaves a very large class of
individuals unprotected. The United States is going through an aging of its
population as the baby boomer generation reaches retirement age. A total
of approximately 43 million individuals were of retirement age by 2012.117
By 2020, that number will balloon to almost fifty six million individuals,
comprising almost sixteen percent of our total population.118 The concern
here is not merely the size of this group, but the fact that they are more
likely to qualify for the financial metrics of the accredited investor stan-
dard combined with their overall poor financial literacy.
The elderly population, as a whole, is amongst the most well-off classes
in the United States. Though specific statistics that qualify this group for
the accredited investor standard are difficult to come by, proxies are avail-
able. A recent study by the U.S. Census Bureau found that the mean net
worth for individuals age 65 and above was over $650,000.119 Breaking this
statistic down even further, the mean net worth for individuals between
the ages of 65 and 69, and 70 and 74, was approximately $820,000 and
$860,000, respectively.120 Even excluding the equity in their homes, indi-
viduals over the age of 65 maintained a mean net worth of over
$500,000.121 While averages must be looked at cautiously,122 it should be
noted that over 20 percent of individuals who were age 65 and above had a
net worth of over $500,000.123 Importantly, large portions of the net worth
for these individuals were comprised of IRA accounts, as well as stocks
and mutual funds.124 This may indicate retirement planning and greater
dependence on these assets for sustainability.
Comparatively, no age group that was age 54 and younger reached
$300,000 in mean net worth.125 Excluding home equity, the highest group,
those between the ages of 45 and 54, had a mean net worth of approxi-
117. Jennifer Ortman, Victoria Velkoff & Howard Hogan, An Aging Nation: The Older
Population in the United States, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 1 (May 2014), https://www.census.gov/
prod/2014pubs/p25-1140.pdf.
118. Id.
119. Net Worth and Asset Ownership of Households: 2011, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http:/
/www.census.gov/people/wealth/files/Wealth_Tables_2011.xlsx (noting also that individuals
approaching retirement age, those between 55 and 64, had sizable net worth as well at an
average of approximately $470,000, and $350,000 excluding home equity).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. The median net worth of individuals in the 65 and over bracket was approximately
$170,000. Individuals who were 65 to 69 and 70 to 74 had net worth of approximately
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mately $200,000.126 Furthermore, only about 14 percent of individuals be-
tween the ages of 45 and 54 had a net worth over $500,000, with a
significant drop off in younger age groups.127
It is not simply that the older generation is more well off then earlier
generations. Research indicates that they are among the most poorly edu-
cated classes in terms of financial literacy.128 A recent study measuring the
financial literacy of individuals in the United States found that less than 30
percent of individuals age 65 and over tested positively, and were the sec-
ond most poorly scoring group behind individuals age 36 and younger.129
In a more focused study, it was found that older generations are generally
not financially sophisticated.130 Individuals in the study lacked under-
standing of key concepts to investment decision-making inducement, risk
diversification, asset valuation, and the effect of investment fees.131 The
authors forecasted bleak implications on older generations in an environ-
ment that allowed for greater responsibility of fund management.132
E. Complexity of Financial Products
There is increased attention on the complexity of ever evolving finan-
cial products, and the investment community’s ability to properly evaluate
them. The examples regarding the derivatives and CDO crises are just one
of several instances. The Certified Financial Planner Board of Standards
cited “increased complexity of financial products and services . . . in the
last 30 years” in recommending increased reliance on investor sophistica-
tion rather than net worth.133 The CFP suggested that the intricacies of
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IV. EVALUATIONS FOR A NEW STANDARD
Under the assumption that strengthening small businesses would boost
the economy during the recession, Congress passed the JOBS Act in a rare
bipartisan effort. Among other changes, the Act instructed Congress to
“provide that the prohibition against general solicitation or general adver-
tising . . . shall not apply to offers and sales of securities made pursuant to
Rule 506” of Regulation D.135 This change allows issuers to target individ-
uals who would not normally consider private placements, and are poorly
equipped to deal with its risks.
Recognizing the issues presented by the accredited investor standard
do not solve the problem, there are still opposing viewpoints as to what
should be favored when designing a new standard. Some proponents seek
to create a test that evaluates investor sophistication above all else.136 On
the other hand, there are individuals that believe adjusting the current
standard could have poor effects on capital formation.137 As discussed, the
SEC has taken the position that one of the purposes of the standard is to
evaluate whether individuals have the financial ability to bear the loss of
their investment.138 This section argues that both investor sophistication,
as well as the ability to bear financial loss, are both important considera-
tions in designing a new standard.
A. The Need for Investor Sophistication
As stated earlier, the presumption for investors participating in private
placements is that they can fend for themselves.139 In place of registration,
the Act substituted private monitoring of disclosures.140 Sophisticated in-
vestors virtually functioned as proxies for federal regulatory authorities in
deciphering material information.141
For this proxy status to be maintained, investors must have “sufficient
skills, resources, or bargaining strength” in relation to the issuers to ex-
tract proper information.142 Knowledgeable consumers who make in-
formed choices make it difficult for unfair and deceptive practices to take
135. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 201(a), 126 Stat. 306,
313–15 (2012).
136. Hamilton, supra note 132.
137. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, Abstract, supra note 27 (stating that “asso-
ciation of angel investors—accredited investors who invest in start-up companies—told GAO
that they would be resistant to increased thresholds because it would decrease the number of
eligible investors”).
138. Investor Bulletin, supra note 77.
139. SEC v. Ralson Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953).
140. See Smith, supra note 39, at 243.
141. See id.
142. See Marianne A. Hilgert, Jeanne M. Hogarth, & Sondra G. Beverly, Household
Financial Management: The Connection between Knowledge and Behavior, 320-321 FED. RE-
SERVE BULLETIN, July 2003, http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2003/0703lead.pdf.
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place in a market.143 Due to this sophistication, it can be argued that in-
vestors who participate in private offerings accept the risks accompanied
by lack of standard disclosures, and transparency in private markets.144
A core factor associated with sophistication is financial literacy.145 Al-
though there are some arguments to the contrary, studies have demon-
strated that there is a substantial link between an individual’s decision-
making and financial stability.146 Studies have also suggested that there is
a link between financial literacy and day-to-day investment decisions.147
Additionally, financial acumen has been linked to precautionary sav-
ings.148 This becomes especially important when considering that the SEC
itself acknowledges that “[o]ne principal purpose of the accredited inves-
tor concept is to identify persons who can bear the economic risk of invest-
ing in these unregistered securities.149 Finally, financial literacy is also
related to overall financial health. Less financially literate individuals are
more likely to have costly mortgages, and may end up accumulating less
wealth.150 Therefore, if the accredited investor standard functions cor-
rectly, individuals participating in the private placement markets should be
adequately protected.
B. The Argument for Bearing Loss of Investments
Perhaps the most convincing argument for why an accredited investor
standard should account for an individual’s ability to bear the loss of their
investment is that investor sophistication does little to guarantee proper
decision making. That may not be an issue where an individual is young
and can recoup a large portion if not all of their losses. However, elderly
individuals do not have such a luxury.151
143. Id. at 309.
144. See SEC v. Ralson Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953) (stating that “[a]n offering
to those who are shown to be able to fend for themselves is a transaction ‘not involving any
public offering.’”).
145. Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 905 (5th Cir. 1977) (stating that
“. . . [t]he investment sophistication of the offeree assumes added importance, for it is impor-
tant that he could have been expected to ask the right questions and seek out the relevant
information.”).
146. See generally Lusardi & Mitchell, supra note 127.
147. See Hilgert, Hogarth, & Beverly, supra note 141, at 317–18 (showing that house-
holds with poor investment scores “had lower overall financial knowledge scores and lower
investment knowledge scores . . . than those who were classified as medium or high on the
investment index.”).
148. Carlo de Bassa Scheresberg, Financial Literacy and Financial Behavior among
Young Adults: Evidence and Implications, 6 NUMERACY, no. 2, 2013, at 16, http://scholarcom-
mons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1138&context=numeracy (“[T]hat financial literacy
was negatively correlated with using high cost of borrowing methods while positively corre-
lated with have precautionary savings and planning for requirement.”).
149. Investor Bulletin, supra note 77.
150. See Lusardi & Mitchell, supra note 127, at 22-23.
151. Note, Larissa Lee, The Ban Has Lifted: Now Is the Time to Change the Accredited-
Investor Standard, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 369, 385 (2014).
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In addition to the institutional failures above, it is possible that finan-
cial experts do not make better investment decisions than less sophisti-
cated investors.152 When measuring the decision making of experts in
relation to their own portfolio, managers do not show a superior ability to
select securities.153 Additionally, while managers, perhaps recognizing
their own limitations, invest a greater amount in mutual funds they still
exhibit similar portfolio concentration as the average investor.154
It must be noted that if an individual loses a substantial portion of their
assets, their costs are not simply bore by those investors. Systemic invest-
ment failures caused by poor decision makers can affect capital formation
as a whole. In the years after the Great Recession net private investments
collapsed substantially.155 Additionally, investors who tapped out of their
savings due to complete losses may actually require assistance through
government aid programs, indirectly imputing costs to taxpayers.
V. A MORE PRECISE STANDARD
As discussed above, the accredited investor standard has several issues
- both in testing investor sophistication and in evaluating an individual’s
ability to bear the loss of their investment. As shown by the need for
crowdfunding implementation, the current rule also inhibits capital forma-
tion.156 Fortunately, due to the Dodd-Frank mandate, there is opportunity
to consider new methods to align the accredited standard to more appro-
priately protect investors and encourage capital formation.
A. Sophistication
The primary purpose for the accredited investor definition should still
be centered on determining investor sophistication. A more appropriate
standard would focus on investor credentials. For instance, investors who
are licensed CFAs and CPAs can be presumed to have the requisite finan-
cial understanding to invest independently. Those individuals who are not
independently licensed should be required to pass an investor sophistica-
tion test.157 Finally, those individuals who are not able to pass the investor
152. Andriy Bodnaruk & Andrei Simonov, Do Financial Experts Make Better Invest-
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sophistication test should be required to seek representation from a quali-
fied individual when entering the private market.
B. Wealth Requirement
The utility of a wealth requirement to entering the public market is
that it restricts investments to those individuals who are able to bear the
loss of their funds. However, imposing a strict income or net assets cut-off
proves to be inflexible and discouraging of capital formation. To address
these issues, the SEC should recognize a sliding scale approach similar to
that required for crowdfunding under the JOBS Act.158 To encourage di-
versification, the regulation should place a cap on investments in any par-
ticular company. However, recognizing that diversification is limited in the
private markets,159 there should also be limits on total investments by an
individual.160
C. Annual Income and Net Assets Definitions
In order to align the accredited investor standard to individuals who
are able to bear the loss of their investment, further clarification to the
definition of annual income and net assets is necessary. Net assets, for
example, should not only exclude primary residence, but illiquid assets
generally.161 If such assets are included, they should be discounted to re-
flect their value in a rushed sale. Finally, recognizing that annual income
fails to measure an individual’s lifestyle,162 discretionary income should be
utilized instead.163
D. Leverage
An increase in leverage will generally have an adverse effect on an
investor’s ability to bear the loss of their funds. As such, the SEC should
also limit an investor’s ability to leverage their assets when investing. For
158. Generally, individual investments during a 12-month period are limited to the
greater of $2,000 or 5 percent of annual income or net worth of the investor, if such investor’s
annual income or net worth is less than $100,000, and to 10 percent of annual income or net
worth if the investor’s income or net worth exceeds $100,000. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2015).
159. See Venture Capital, U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION (last visited May 11,
2015), https://www.sba.gov/content/venture-capital (expressing the proposition that venture
capital funding focuses on young companies that are considered riskier investments).
160. In contrast, the current JOBS Act provisions allow for unlimited investments. See
Lee, supra note 150, at 371.
161. See Lee, supra note 79, at 992-94 (explaining that the accredited investor standard
does not accurately reflect an investor’s true discretionary income when it includes illiquid
assets).
162. Id. at 993 (explaining that because the gross income standard “fails to consider the
full extent of an individual’s expenses, an investor may have sufficient adjusted gross income,
but may not have the requisite funds to absorb financial losses.”).
163. Id. at 994-95 (“The discretionary income standard is a better financial measure of
determining whether a particular investor can afford to make risky investments because it
quantifies his or her capacity to absorb financial losses.”).
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instance, it may be appropriate to prohibit leveraged investments gener-
ally, but to allow it for institutional investors.
VI. CONCLUSION
The current standard for an accredited investor, although having the
virtue of clarity and ease of implementation, fails at protecting individuals
in the private market. Utilization of wealth is a poor proxy for investor
sophistication. The SEC should use the Dodd-Frank mandate to create a
more tailored accredited investor standard. Given that participation in the
private market has evolved since Ralston Purina, the SEC should balance
capital formation, loss bearing, and investor sophistication as key policy
concerns in reviewing the current standard.
